The list and why it is worth reading literally
PitchBook published a list of software companies it considers likely 2027 take-private candidates, reported by Fortune's Term Sheet newsletter on November 17. The names include BILL, the payments and spend management platform used widely by mid-market finance teams, Rapid7, the cybersecurity vendor known for vulnerability management, First Advantage, which handles background screening and workforce data for employers, and Fastly, called out separately in the piece for having much faster revenue growth than the rest of the names on the list.
PitchBook is explicit that this is a probability exercise built from a mix of past deal patterns, quarterly financial statements, and share price performance relative to comparable peers, and the firm is careful to frame it as not investment advice and not a confirmed deal pipeline of any kind. The reason enterprise buyers should still take it seriously is PitchBook's own track record earlier this year: the firm's analyst correctly flagged both Bumble and Varonis as likely acquisition targets well before either deal was publicly announced.
The financial pattern that puts a company on this list
Steven Buibish, PitchBook's director of U.S. private equity research, described the underlying profile directly in the piece: strong free cash flow, solid operating margins, and a share price that is relatively cheap when measured against that cash flow generation. BILL generated roughly $83 million in free cash flow in the quarter ended September 30 alone. Rapid7 produced $26.5 million in free cash flow despite its revenue actually declining 2.5% year over year during the same period. First Advantage carries an adjusted EBITDA margin of roughly 29%, well above what many comparable companies manage.
None of these four names are growth stories in the way venture-backed software companies are typically pitched to public investors. That omission is actually the point of the whole exercise. Private equity buyers fitting this specific profile are not betting on future acceleration at all, they are betting on a company that throws off cash reliably today and trades below what that cash flow would reasonably justify in a healthier overall software market. Buibish called it purely a probability exercise based on history, but history is precisely what makes a pattern like this one repeatable across cycles.
This year's actual deals show the pattern already playing out
The deals that have already closed or been announced this year validate the underlying thesis fairly directly. Thoma Bravo agreed to take Kneat private for roughly $454 million back in June, completing that deal in August without much fanfare. Ithaca Holdings then agreed to buy Bumble in a $1.3 billion all-cash deal on October 13. Just two days later, Proofpoint, itself backed by Thoma Bravo, announced a $6.3 billion acquisition of Varonis, a deal currently expected to close sometime in the first half of 2027.
The scale of these deals escalated quickly as the year went on. Reuters reported in August that Silver Lake had held talks to buy Workday outright, a deal that would have ranked among the largest software buyouts ever attempted by any firm. That reported talk did not need to actually close to make the broader point: the take-private wave has clearly moved from mid-cap security and workflow vendors toward companies that sit at the very center of enterprise ERP and HR technology stacks, which represents a meaningfully different risk category for the CIOs who depend on them daily.
Financing risk is the variable that could stall this wave
The Fortune piece also flags clearly why none of this is a certainty going forward. The Federal Reserve raised rates in September, and sticky inflation could plausibly bring further increases before 2027 arrives, which makes leveraged buyout financing meaningfully more expensive across the board for every prospective acquirer. Some banks already carry heavy software exposure from earlier deals, or are still quietly working through debt from transactions that have not performed as originally modeled. Citrix's 2022 buyout is the cautionary example the article cites directly: banks sold $8.55 billion of acquisition debt at a roughly $600 million loss, then had to sell another $3.8 billion in bonds the following year just to manage the fallout from that first mistake.
Buibish's own caveat is worth repeating in full because it sets the real constraint on the whole list: there has to be a genuine appetite for private credit, or for the banks themselves, to finance these transactions at the pace his list implies for any of this to actually play out as described. A broader software stock rebound could also simply make these specific targets too expensive to acquire before a deal gets fully structured and financed. The list describes likelihood based on financial profile, not inevitability, and the real gating factor throughout is capital markets appetite, not corporate acquisition interest.
What this means for vendor risk planning
A take-private deal is not automatically bad news for an enterprise customer sitting on the other side of a contract. OneStream's own CEO argued publicly that going private under Hg back in January would actually accelerate the company's AI roadmap by removing quarterly earnings pressure that had been constraining longer-term investment. But a change of ownership does change the vendor relationship in predictable ways: new ownership structure, new debt service obligations that have to be serviced out of operating cash flow, and historically a higher chance of price increases or reduced roadmap investment in products the new private owner does not consider core to the thesis.
The actionable step for any enterprise with BILL, Rapid7, First Advantage, or a similarly profiled vendor already embedded in its stack is to treat this list as a prompt to run a vendor risk review now, well before any acquisition is publicly announced, rather than scrambling to react after the fact. Multi-year contract terms, data portability clauses, and clearly defined exit costs are all far easier to negotiate favorably before a deal becomes public knowledge than during the twelve months of integration uncertainty that almost always follows one once it is announced.



