What happened in the second wave
An unknown threat actor accessed refrigeration controllers at supermarkets across six European countries this month, Belgium, Luxembourg, Estonia, Ireland, Sweden, and Finland, switching the units into defrost mode and pushing internal temperatures as high as 50 degrees Celsius, well beyond the range needed to spoil fresh and frozen inventory within hours. Carrefour confirmed that 15 of its roughly 700 stores in Belgium were affected by this specific incident, with store teams discovering the fault only after perishable stock had already begun to warm.
That scope is meaningfully smaller than the October wave, which hit more than 700 stores, mainly in France, and caused tens of millions of euros in spoiled inventory, with individual stores losing as much as 130,000 euros each. The smaller footprint of this second wave does not necessarily signal a less serious threat, it may simply reflect a narrower initial access point or a deliberately limited test of the same technique that worked at much larger scale weeks earlier.
The equipment at the center of both attacks
Researchers, including France's national cybersecurity agency CERT, linked both waves of attacks to internet-connected refrigeration controllers manufactured by Danfoss, Dixell, and Copeland, three established industrial equipment vendors whose products sit inside a large share of European commercial refrigeration infrastructure. Copeland specifically traced one of the French incidents to a discontinued generation of its supervisory controllers still running in production environments, years after the company had stopped actively supporting that hardware line.
That detail, equipment from a discontinued product generation still actively controlling live refrigeration systems, is a pattern familiar to anyone who has worked in industrial or operational technology security. Discontinued hardware frequently stops receiving active vendor support and firmware updates well before it stops running in the field, creating a widening gap between what a device is capable of defending against and what it is actually still exposed to as attack techniques evolve around it.
The detail that should concern every retailer running this equipment
Danfoss stated plainly that it had identified and disclosed the relevant vulnerabilities the previous year and has long recommended that customers install the available patches. That timeline matters enormously: this was not a novel zero-day vulnerability discovered and exploited within some tight window before a fix could be developed, it was a known flaw with an available patch that a meaningful number of retailers across multiple countries had evidently not yet applied by the time attackers came looking for it.
That gap between patch availability and patch application is the real story underneath both waves of this attack, more than the specific attacker's identity or motive. A vulnerability disclosed and patched a year before exploitation represents a patching cycle failure on the retailer and operator side, not a failure of the vendor's disclosure process, and it is the kind of gap that security researchers consistently flag as the most common root cause behind operational technology incidents generally.
Why operational technology security gets deprioritized in retail
John Gallagher, vice president at OT and IoT security vendor Viakoo, offered a blunt assessment of why this keeps happening: misconfigurations and systemic hygiene failures represent the vast majority of the threat surface in operational technology environments, not sophisticated novel attack techniques. Refrigeration controllers, HVAC systems, and similar operational technology infrastructure frequently sit outside the patch management discipline that IT security teams apply rigorously to servers, laptops, and conventional network infrastructure.
Sean Tufts, field chief technology officer at industrial security firm Claroty, extended that point beyond retail specifically, noting that the same types of weaknesses can exist across different industries, from manufacturing to healthcare to retail refrigeration. That cross-industry pattern suggests any organization running internet-connected operational technology equipment, not just supermarkets, should treat this incident as a direct warning about its own OT patch management discipline, regardless of whether refrigeration specifically is part of its own infrastructure.
The business continuity angle most retailers have not modeled
Most retail business continuity planning focuses on point-of-sale outages, payment processing failures, or ecommerce platform downtime, the kinds of incidents that directly block a transaction from completing. A refrigeration-targeted attack is a different category entirely: it does not stop a single sale, it destroys inventory that was already paid for and already on the shelf, converting a security incident directly into a cost-of-goods loss that shows up on the balance sheet rather than in a lost-sales figure.
That distinction matters for how retail risk and security teams should be scoping their own operational technology coverage. A business continuity plan that accounts for checkout system failures but has never modeled a refrigeration or cold-chain controller compromise has a real gap, one this specific attack pattern, now confirmed across two separate waves and seven total countries, has demonstrated is both technically feasible and already actively being exploited in production retail environments.
What this means for your own refrigeration and OT infrastructure
If your organization operates refrigeration, HVAC, or other internet-connected operational technology equipment from Danfoss, Dixell, Copeland, or similar industrial vendors, confirm directly and immediately whether every unit in your fleet has the latest available firmware and security patches applied, rather than assuming your facilities or operations team has already handled this as a matter of routine. The gap between patch availability and patch application is exactly what both waves of this attack exploited.
More broadly, extend your organization's vulnerability management program to explicitly include operational technology assets that your IT security team may not currently track with the same discipline applied to conventional network infrastructure. If refrigeration controllers are reachable from the internet in your environment at all, that connectivity itself deserves a direct review, since segregating OT equipment from internet-facing networks remains one of the most effective available defenses against exactly this kind of attack.

