What Volexity found
Volexity discovered a campaign exploiting Ivanti Connect Secure SSL VPN appliances through a chain of three vulnerabilities and reported it to Ivanti, tracking the underlying threat activity under the designation UTA0576 in its own internal threat cluster naming system used for activity it cannot yet confidently attribute to a known group. The first element, CVE-2026-111357, is a missing authentication flaw for a critical function that lets a local authenticated attacker escalate privileges on the appliance well beyond what their initial access level should ever allow under normal configuration. The second, CVE-2026-118527, is a generation of predictable numbers or identifiers vulnerability that enables remote authenticated file upload, giving attackers a reliable way to plant arbitrary content directly on the device itself without needing further social engineering or any additional access beyond what the first flaw already granted them.
Both were exploited as zero-days, meaning attackers were using them before Ivanti had a patch available. The attackers chained these with a separate, previously known flaw, CVE-2026-104935, an authentication bypass and remote code execution vulnerability, to build a complete path from unauthenticated access to code execution on the appliance. Rapid7's analysis of the same campaign independently confirmed the credential theft and Active Directory reconnaissance Volexity observed.
What the attackers actually did once inside
This was not a smash-and-grab operation aimed at quick, visible disruption that would tip off defenders within hours. The attackers used the compromised SSL VPN appliances as a covert foothold into target networks, the kind of persistent, quiet access that is valuable to an intruder precisely because it does not announce itself to defenders monitoring for obvious signs of compromise across their environment. From that foothold, Rapid7 reports the attackers engaged in credential theft and queried Active Directory specifically for Windows LAPS passwords and BitLocker recovery keys, two credential types that, once obtained, grant an attacker the ability to access and decrypt endpoints across the environment without needing to individually compromise each machine through its own separate, time-consuming attack path.
Volexity assesses with high confidence that this activity was preparation for lateral movement deeper into the network, the stage that typically precedes data theft, ransomware deployment, or long-term espionage access. The operation was detected and disrupted before reaching that stage, which means the attackers' ultimate objective in this specific campaign remains unknown, a reminder that disruption is not the same as understanding what you prevented.
Why your integrity checker will not save you
The detail that should concern every team running Ivanti Connect Secure is that this activity evades Ivanti's own Integrity Checker Tool, the mechanism specifically designed and marketed to detect tampering on these appliances after a suspected compromise. A clean result from that tool does not mean your appliance is actually uncompromised; it means only that the specific tampering this particular tool was built to catch is not present, which is a considerably narrower and far less reassuring statement than most security teams assume when they see a passing scan result on their dashboard.
This is not a new problem for this product line, and that history matters for how much trust you place in the vendor's own tooling going forward. Ivanti Connect Secure has had a documented history of attackers specifically engineering evasion of its own security tooling across multiple prior incidents, and any organization treating integrity checker results as a clean bill of health on these appliances is working from an assumption the threat actors actively targeting this specific product have already learned to defeat repeatedly.
The remediation timeline you are already behind on
CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog entries carried binding remediation deadlines for federal civilian agencies: November 2, 2026 for CVE-2026-111357, with a requirement to also perform forensic triage and investigate possible compromise, not just patch, and November 13 for CVE-2026-118527. Both dates have already passed. If your organization has not yet remediated, you are not early to this fix, you are late by weeks, and the exposure window has already included documented active exploitation.
The remediation sequence that matters here is not just applying Ivanti's updates, though all three chained flaws now have fixes available. Preserve memory and logs before rebooting or resetting any potentially affected appliance, since that evidence disappears the moment you restart the device, and investigate for compromise after patching rather than treating the patch itself as resolution. If compromise is suspected, follow Ivanti's documented recovery steps and rotate every credential the appliance had visibility into, not just the ones you can confirm were accessed.
What this means for your VPN appliance strategy
This campaign fits a pattern that should inform how you think about edge VPN appliances generally: they are simultaneously the most exposed component in your network architecture and frequently the least instrumented for detection, running vendor-controlled software stacks your own security team cannot fully inspect. Volexity and Rapid7 have published indicators of compromise and YARA rules on GitHub for organizations wanting to hunt for this specific campaign, and that threat hunting guidance is worth running against your environment regardless of whether you believe you were targeted.
Longer term, treat the integrity checker evasion as the more important finding here than the specific CVEs, because it tells you something about the ceiling on vendor-supplied detection tooling for this entire class of edge device. Any organization with Ivanti Connect Secure or comparable SSL VPN appliances in its environment should be running independent detection, not relying solely on the vendor's own tooling to tell them whether they have been compromised.



