What was actually sitting in the open
CSC Telecom's Latvian branch operates as an SMS gateway, sending text messages on behalf of banks, insurers, retailers, and government services across the Baltic region. Researchers found its ClickHouse database, the analytical datastore the company used to log every message it routed, sitting fully accessible on the public internet with no authentication required. The database held more than 125 million messages spanning October 2022 through September 2026, updated continuously as new messages were sent, meaning anyone who found the database could watch live SMS traffic arrive in real time rather than inspecting a static historical dump.
The contents went well beyond sender and recipient metadata. Full message text was stored alongside timestamps, pricing, and network routing information, which meant one-time authentication codes, password reset links, medical test results, travel confirmations, shipping addresses, and bank transaction alerts were all sitting in plain text for anyone who located the database. A live feed of that content is a meaningfully more dangerous exposure than a leaked archive, since an attacker monitoring the stream in real time could intercept a one-time code or reset link before the intended recipient ever saw their phone.
The customer list reads like a cross-section of Baltic daily life
The businesses whose messages passed through the exposed database span nearly every category of sensitive communication a consumer receives by text. Swedbank and SEB used the service for banking-related messages, with SEB specifically confirming it sent pension fund marketing texts through CSC Telecom. Insurers ERGO, Compensa, and Artea sent policy and claims communications, while Latvia's own 112 emergency hotline used the same gateway. Retailers and services including Porsche, CityBee, Barbora, EuroCash, DEPO, Akropolis, IKI, PerlasGo, and Autoplius rounded out the Latvian side, alongside airline airBaltic and healthcare providers Sypsenos Akademija and Denticija across the border in Lithuania.
That breadth is exactly what makes this exposure dangerous beyond any single company's customer base. Researchers noted that years of accumulated message history across this many categories of service could be used to build a detailed profile of an individual phone number's owner, their bank, their insurer, their shopping habits, and their travel patterns, all cross-referenced against a single identifier. Knowing which specific services a phone number uses is also a direct input into a more convincing, targeted phishing attempt than a generic message ever could be.
Four years open, a month to close after disclosure
The timeline here is the detail enterprise security and procurement teams should sit with longest. The earliest messages in the exposed database date to October 20, 2022, meaning the database was likely accessible, in some form, for close to four years before anyone caught it. Researchers discovered the open database on September 28, 2026, and disclosed it to CSC Telecom the following day. The company did not actually close the database until around October 27, nearly a full month after being notified, during which time the live SMS feed continued streaming in real time to anyone who still had the address.
CSC Telecom has described the issue to at least one affected customer, Latvian insurer Artea, as a security incident tied to an identified access configuration vulnerability, language that places the fault squarely in how the database was deployed rather than in any external attack. Artea has since suspended all use of CSC Telecom's services and opened its own internal investigation. Researchers say they found no evidence the exposure was exploited maliciously, but they are careful to note that absence of evidence is not evidence of absence across a four-year exposure window; other parties may well have found the same unprotected database and simply left no trace.
The vendor-notification gap that should worry every enterprise buyer
SEB's response to reporters contains the single most instructive detail in this entire incident for any enterprise relying on a third-party vendor to handle customer communications: the bank says CSC Telecom never informed it of the security incident at all. SEB only learned of the exposure through media coverage, despite being a named, if limited, customer of the exposed service. That gap, a vendor experiencing a four-year data exposure and not proactively notifying even its own paying customers once the issue was discovered, is a sharper indictment of CSC Telecom's incident response than the underlying misconfiguration itself.
airBaltic's response offers a more defensible model for affected customers to follow: the airline is actively assessing the situation with the provider directly and has proactively urged its own customers to be wary of suspicious texts, emails, and calls in the aftermath, rather than waiting on the vendor to supply guidance. That split, between a customer learning about a vendor's breach from the press and one actively pushing the vendor for answers while independently warning its own users, illustrates exactly the kind of vendor accountability gap enterprise security teams need to close through contract terms, not goodwill.
What this means for your own SMS and messaging vendor contracts
If your organization routes SMS, one-time codes, or any customer notification through a third-party gateway, this incident is a direct prompt to ask that vendor specifically how long it retains message content, whether that content is stored in plain text, and what authentication protects the datastore holding it, rather than assuming a vendor handling sensitive codes applies the same security rigor to its own logging infrastructure that it markets to you. A four-year exposure window at CSC Telecom means this was not a brief misconfiguration caught quickly; it was a sustained architectural failure that nobody internally or externally caught until an outside research team happened to find it.
Equally important, build an explicit vendor-notification requirement into your messaging contracts now, given that SEB learned of this exposure from reporters rather than from CSC Telecom directly despite being a paying customer. Require contractual language obligating your SMS, email, or any communications vendor to notify you within a defined window of any confirmed data exposure affecting your organization's traffic, and treat a vendor's silence on retention policy or incident history as a reason to ask harder questions before your next renewal, not after the next headline names them.



